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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~IAX FAUSETT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CONTRACTS 
CORPORATION, a foreign corpora-
tion, and WILLIA:Jf HOLDAWAY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 6251 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT GENERAL ELECTRIC 
CONTRACTS CORPORATION 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In July, 1938, Defendant William Holdaway and one 
Earl Fausett were doing business in Price, Utah, as the 
Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company; selling, among 
other things, Hot Point refrigerators. On July 7, 1938 
these partners sold Plaintiff Max Fausett a Hot Point 
refrigerator for a total purchase price, including sales 
tax, of $216.64. The contract attached to Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint as Exhibit "A" (Tr. 19a, Ab. 12) 
recited a cash payment of $75.00, the balance due in 
fourteen consecutive monthly installments of $10.00 each, 
eommencing July 25, 1938, and the final payment being 
in the sum of $11.64. 
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' 
Plaintiff was given possession of the refrigerator 
and placed it in his home in Price, Utah. On May 29, 
1939 Defendant William Holdaway went to the home of 
Max Fausett in Price, Utah for the purpose of repossess-
ing the refrigerator. No one was at home, the door was 
open and Defendant Holdaway took the refrigerator out 
of the house. (Tr. 254-255, Ab. 134). 
On July 13, 1939 Plaintiff commenced this action 
against the Defendants General Electric Contracts Cor~ 
poration and William Holdaway for the unlawful repos-
session of the refrigerator. 
After July 7, 1938, when the refrigerator in question 
was sold to Plaintiff, the partnership between William 
Holdaway and Earl Fausett was dissolved. (Tr. 30, Ab. 
89). 
The contract which was taken by the Carbon Furni-
ture & Appliance Company from the Plaintiff Holdawayt 
which is Plaintiff's Exhibit "A", and a copy of which 
is attached to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Ab. 13) 
among other things provided that 
''Title to said property shall not pass to the 
· Buyer until said Total Time Price is fully paid 
in cash. * * * Should the Buyer fail to pay said 
Time Price or any part thereof when due, *' • • the 
entire unpaid balance shall at once become rlue 
and payable at the Seller's election, and the Seller 
may, without notice or demand, by process of la\v 
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or otherwise, take possession of said property 
wherever located, and retain all moneys paid 
thereon for the reasonable use of said property, 
* * *. The Buyer waives all claims, damages and 
de1nands against the Seller arising out of the 
repossession, retention and sale as aforesaid.'' 
''Time is of the essence of this contract. All 
rights and remedies hereunder are cumulative and 
not alternative.'' 
This contract was sold to General Electric Contracts 
Corporation shortly after its execution. (Tr. 14, Ab. 87). 
Pursuant to a dealer's agreement between General Elec-
tric Contracts Corporation and Carbon Second Hand 
Store, which is Defendants' Exhibit 1, (Tr. 31, Ab. 89) 
(also Tr. 405 to 413) whereby the Carbon Second Hand 
Store, sometimes referred to as Carbon Furniture & 
Appliance Company, guaranteed ''the payment of all 
deferred payments on accounts sold to you (General 
Electric Contracts Corporation) hereunder at the time 
and in the manner specified in the accounts, and we 
(Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company) further cove-
nant that if there shall be default in the payment of any 
two installments of an account or in the performance of 
any requirement imposed on the Buyer therein, we shall 
pay you in cash, on demand, an amount equal to the 
unpaid balance on said account less such proper portion 
of your purchase charge as you may determine.'' 
After the contract had been purchased by General 
Electric Contracts Corporation the following payments 
were received : 
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b 
Payment due July 29, 1938, received August 15, 
1938; 
Payment due August 29, 1938, received September 
19,1938; 
Payment due on September 29, 1938, received De-
cember 1, 1938; 
Payment due October 29, 1938, received one-half 
December 1, 1938 and one-half February 21, 
1939; 
Payment due November 29, 1938, received Feb-
ruary 21, 1939 ; · 
Payment due December 29, 1938, received Feb-
ruary 21, 1939 ; 
Payment due January 29, 1939, received April 
7, 1939; 
Payment due February 29, 1939, received one-half 
April 7, 1939. 
There were no further payments made and the refriger-
ator was repossessed on May 29, 1939. 
During the time that Plaintiff was in possession of 
the refrigerator in question Defendant General Electric 
Contracts Corporation wrote collection letters to the 
Plaintiff or his wife under the following dates: 
November 3, 1938 
November 9, 1938 
November 16, 1938 
N ov~mber 22, 1938 
December 1, 1938 
December 16, 1938 
December 22, 1938 
December 28, 1938 
February 27, 1939 
March 27, 1939 
March 13, 1939 
March 23, 1939 
April 7, 1939 
April 27, 1939 
~lay 4, 1939 
~fay 11, 1939 
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The letter of ~fay 11, 1939, reads as foll-ows : ( Tr. 
<:1:3-1, Defendants' Ex. 8). 
''Dear nfr. Fausett : 
''Your lack of response to my letter of May 
4 is disappointing. 
''I cannot believe you would willingly lose 
the large equity which you have without making 
some effort to protect it. 
"However, since you have not replied to my 
previous letters and have not made payment on 
your account, we are instructing your dealer to 
take immediate action to enforce the penalties 
outlined in your contract. 
''You may still keep the merchandise if you 
wish, upon payment of $66.64, which represents 
the balance due on the account. 
''Very truly yours, 
H. P. GouGH, Manager." 
"hpgjlb 
On May 12, 1939, General Electric Contracts Corpo-
ration wrote to Defendant Holdaway, who was then run-
ning the Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company, as 
follows: (Tr. 436, Defendants' Ex. 10). 
'' Dear Bill : 
"In accordance with our conversation, we are 
attaching our formal repurchase request on the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
Max Fausett account. I wish you would advise 
me as soon as you are successful in obtaining this 
merchandise. 
''Very truly yours, 
H. P. GouGH.'' 
On May 29, 1939 Defendant Holdaway repossessed 
the refrigerator (Tr. 254, Ab. 134) and stored it in the 
William Campbell warehouse in Price. (Tr. 255, Ab. 135) 
and eventually resold it in the latter part of June to 
J. R. Moyle, for $100.00. 
About July 13, 1939 Pete Woolsey, brother-in-law of 
Plaintiff, offered Defendant Holdaway a check for $66.64 
as the balance due on the refrigerator. (Tr. 286, Ab. 137). 
Defendant Holdaway refused to accept it and claimed 
there was a balance due of $96.64, that there was still 
$30.00 due him as the down payment on the refrigerator. 
(Tr. 287, Ab. 138). Defendant Holdaway figured that 
he was entitled to the $4.00 difference between the amount 
due him and the amount received from the resale of the 
refrigerator as part of his expenses and costs. ( Tr. 294, 
Ab. 139). 
At the trial of the case the Defendant General Elec-
tric Contracts Corporation moved for a non-suit on the 
following grounds: (Tr. 173, Ab. 116). 
First: That there is no evidence of a conver-
sion of the personal property described in the 
plaintiff's complaint. 
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Second: That there is no evidence to go to the 
JUry as to any damages suffered by the defen-
dants. 
Third: That there is no evidence that the de-
fendant. ''"rillian1 Holda\vay, was, at the time that 
he repossessed the refrigerator, acting as the 
agent of this defendant. 
And at the conclusion of the Defendants' case the 
Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation mov-
ed for directed verdict upon the following grounds: (Tr. 
306, Ab. 142). 
First: That there is no evidence to go to the 
jury of any conversion of the refrigerator in ques-
tion by the Defendant, General Electric Contracts 
Corporation. 
Second: That there is no evidence of damage, 
if any, suffered by plaintiff, to be passed upon 
by the jury. · 
Third: That there is no evidence to be con-
sidered by the jury relative to the question 
whether the defendant Holdaway, at any time, 
acted as agent for the General Electric Contracts 
Corporation. 
Fourth: That counsel for plaintiff has stated 
that his action is an action in claim and delivery, 
. and the evidence affirmatively and without dis-
pute shows that at the time of the commencement 
of the action that this defendant was not in pt>s ... 
session of the refrigerator in question. 
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This motion was joined in by Defendant William 
Holdaway. Both of these motions were overruled and 
the case submitted to the jury. (Tr. 386, Ab. 57). The 
jury returned a verdict for $75.00 for wrongful posses-
sion and retention of the refrigerator and $184.14 the 
value of the refrigerator. It being apparent that the 
amount fixed by the jury as the value of the refrigerator 
was greater than its cost less the amount still due upon 
the same, Plaintiff filed a document captioned "Remit-
titur'' whereby Plaintiff attempted to remit from the 
verdict of the jury the sum of $66.64. (Tr. 141, Ab. 60). 
This was accompanied by Plaintiff's motion to reduce 
judgment, (Tr. 142, Ab. 60) which motion was granted 
and the judgment reduced on February 19, 1940. (Tr. 
145, Ab. 61). 
Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation, 
filed a motion for new trial ( Tr. 136, A b. 59) which was, 
on the 19th of February, 1940, duly denied. ( Tr. 146, 
Ab. 62). 
QUESTIONS TO BE DETERMINED 
UPON THIS APPEAL 
A multitude of questions could be made out of the 
errors which were committed in the trial of this case and 
that are raised by the Assignment of Errors. However, 
they may be simply grouped and determined as follows: 
1. There was no unlawful repossession of the Fau-
sett refrigerator by William Holdaway, and the evidence 
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failing to support such an unlawful repossession, the 
court erred in refusing~ Defendants' motion for non-suit 
and Defendants' motion for a directed verdict, and the 
same question is incorporated in the exceptions taken to 
the instructions of the court. 
2. There is no evidence that William Holdaway, in 
repossessing the refrigerator, was acting as the agent of 
General Electric Contracts Corporation, and accordingly 
the court erred in denying Defendants' motion for a non-
suit and Defendants' motion for directed verdict, as well 
as in his instructions to the jury on this point. 
3. The court erred in his instructions to the jury 
on the question of damages and the jury failed to follow 
the instructions of the court in returning a verdict for 
more than the initial cost price of the refrigerator less 
the admitted unpaid balance due thereon and the court 
could not correct this error by arbitrarily deducting from 
the verdict of the jury the unpaid balance due thereon. 
THERE WAS NO UNLAWFUL REPOSSESSION 
OF THE FAUSETT REFRIGERATOR 
There seems to be no dispute about the following 
facts. 
The refrigerator was sold under a title retaining 
contract, reciting a $75.00 down payment, calling for 
fourteen monthly installments of $10.00 each, with the 
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exception of the final installment which was to be $11.64. 
The first installment was due July 25, 1938. This con-
tract, which has been discussed in the statement of facts, 
retained title in the seller and gave the seller the right, 
without notice or demand or process of law, to retake 
possession of the refrigerator wherever located upon the 
buyer's failing to make any of the payments when due. 
There is no question whatever but that the buyer had 
been in default under said contract from the beginning, 
and that at no time was the contract current. (Ab. 126, 
Tr. 215). At the time the refrigerator was repossessed 
only one-half of the payment due in February had been 
paid and all of the installments for March, April and 
May were past due. In addition thereto the Defendant 
General Electric Contracts Corporation had written the 
Plaintiff on May 11, to the effect that by reason of the 
payments not having been made the dealer was going 
to take immediate action to enforce the penalties in the 
contract. The Plaintiff's attention was also called to the 
fact at that time that he could redeem the merchandise 
upon the payment of $66.64. (Defendants' Ex. 8, Tr. 
434). 
As to the manner in which the refrigerator was re-
possessed, there is no dispute and all witnesses are 
agreed that no one was at home at the Fausett dwelling 
when the refrigerator was repossessed. The wife of 
Plaintiff, Sylvia Fausett, so testified. (Ab. 95, Tr. 62). 
She said that she left the house unlocked and when she 
returned about five days later she found the refrigerator 
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,vas gone, but that the contents had been taken out and 
placed upon a chair. ~Irs. Fausett's statement to De-
fendant Holda,vay over the telephone on her return was 
as follows: ''Well, I asked hhn just what business he had 
going in 1n.y ho1ne when I was not there and taking my 
refrigerator.·' This would indicate that she had sort of 
expected to have the refrigerator repossessed. 
The only other witnesses to testify concerning the 
repossession of the refrigerator are Defendant Holdaway 
and the man who accompanied him, Clarence Packer. On 
this subject Defendant Holdaway said (Ab. 134, Tr. 254), 
''There was no one home, the door was open and I could 
see the refrigerator in there.'' 
There is no testimony or evidence offered or intro-
duced in this matter indicating that there was any breach 
of the peace _of any sort committed by Defendant Hold-
away in repossessing the refrigerator. The evidence is, 
furthermore, without dispute that the Fausett contract 
was sadly in default when the refrigerator was repos-
sessed. The evidence further shows without dispute that 
during the period from July to May, during which the 
Fausetts had had possession of the refrigerator, the De-
fendant General Electric Contracts Corporation had 
written the Fausetts fifteen collection letters, and that at 
each time the contract was in default and in addition 
thereto Defendant Holdaway had made numerous per-
sonal calls and telephone calls to the Fausetts relative to 
their delinquent account. 
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The general rule applicable to this situation is well 
stated in 
24 R. C. L. 486 
as follows: 
''On the default of the buyer the seller may, 
ordinarily, exercise his right to retake possession 
without resort to the courts. And it is said that 
the seller has an implied irrevocable license to 
enter the buyer's premises and remove the goods 
on breach of the contract; and a fortiori, if the 
right so to re-enter is expressly reserved to the 
seller it cannot }?e revoked by the buyer and, after 
an attempted revocation, it may be exercised with-
out liability to the buyer for trespass.'' 
This rule has been sustained in a great many cases. 
The Massachusetts court, in the case of 
Lambert v. Robinson, 37 N. E. 753 
held that where the contract so provided the seller had 
a right to forcefully enter a farmer's dwelling house for 
the purpose of taking property conditionally sold when 
the buyer had failed to meet the payments provided there-
In. 
The Maryland court, in the case of 
Walsh v. Taylor, 39 Md. 592 
held that under a contract similar to that now before the 
Court, upon the default of the buyer, the seller had a 
r~ght to enter upon the buyer's property to reclaim pos-
session of the buyer's property sold under a conditional 
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sale contract. The court said that the clause in the con-
ditional sale contract giving the seller the right to re-
possess the property 'vithout legal proceedings, and also 
the right to enter upon the buyer's property for that 
purpose, gave the seller an irrevocable license or a li-
cense coupled 'vith an interest which the buyer could not 
withdraw so as to hold the seller to be a trespasser. To 
the same effect see 
TValker Furniture Co. v. Dyson, 32 App. D. C. 
90. 
The Alabama court, in the case of 
JlrfcCarty-Greene Motor Co. v. House, 216 Ala. 
666, 114 s. 60 
supports the same rule. 
The Iowa court, in the case of 
Flaherty v. Ginsberg, 135 Iowa 743, 110 N. W. 
1050 
sustained the right of the vendor to retake without judi-
cial process where such a right was given in the contract~ 
The courts have held in a number of cases that a 
peaceable retaking by the vendor upon the default of 
the vendee without legal process gives the vendee no 
cause of action against the vendor. 
Swain v. Schild (1917), 66 Ind. App. 156, 117 
N. E. 933 
Van Wren v. Flynn (1882), 34 La. Ann. 1158 
Heath v. Randall ( 1849), 4 Cush. (Mass.) 195 
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Vorenberg v. American House Hotel Co. 
(1923), 246 ~fass. 108, 140 N. E. 297 
Lynch v. Sable-Oberteuffer-Peterson, 260 P. 
222, 122 Ore. 597 
North v. Williams (1888), 120 Pa. 109, 6 An1. 
St. Rep. 695, 13 A. 723 
Abel v. M. H. Pickering Co. (1914), 58 Pa. Sup. 
Ct. 439 
Although the Plaintiff has not specifically pleaded 
a case contending that the Plaintiff had a right to re-
deem the refrigerator after it had once been repossessed, 
nevertheless the court saw fit to allow considerable testi-
mony to be introduced on Plaintiff's request and par-
ticularly the testimony of Sylvia Fausett (Ab. 97, Tr. 
78-90) and the testimony of the brother of Plaintiff's 
wife, Myron Woolsey (Ab. 107, Tr. 134-138) and the 
testimony of Clara Pierce, (Ab. 108, Tr. 139-141) all to 
the effect that after the refrigerator had been repos-
sessed by Defendant Holdaway they tendered the bal-
ance due thereon, $66.64. 
The authorities are quite uniform to the effect that 
after property has been lawfully repossessed by the seller 
tfie buyer has no right of redemption. 
Penchof v. Heller, 176 Minn. 493, 223 N. W. 911 
Lynch v. Sable-Oberteuffer-Peterson, supra 
Silverthorne v. Simon, 59 Cal. App. 494, 211 
P. 26 
In view of the foregoing authorities Appellant con-
tends that there was no evidence of any unlawful repos-
session of the refrigerator in question and that the court 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
erred in refusing Appellants' motion for a non-suit on 
that ground and further erred in refusing Appellants' 
motion for a directed verdict, and in refusing and deny-
ing Appellants' requested Instructions Nos. 1 and 2, and 
on this ground alone the case should be reversed. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT WILLIAM HOLD-
AWAY IN THE REPOSSESSION OF THE REFRIG-
ERATOR WAS ACTING AS AGENT OF GENERAL 
ELECTRIC CONTRACTS CORPORATION. 
This question was squarely presented to the Court 
in this Defendant's motion for non-snit as well as its 
motion for a directed verdict, both of which motions 
were denied. It was also squarely presented in Defend-
ant'B requested instructions Nos. 4 and 5 which were 
refused by the court and the court in his instructions 
definitely held that as a matter of law the Defendant 
Holdaway in repossessing the refrigerator in question 
was acting as the agent of Defendant General Electric 
Contracts Corporation. In this respect Instruction No. 
15 is informative where the court said, 
"The court instructs the jury that it is im-
Inaterial who was the actual owner of said refri-
gerator on May 30, 1939, yet, if you find that the 
plaintiff was entitled to the possession of said re-
frigerator on that date, then your verdict must 
be for the plaintiff and against the defendants for 
the possession of said refrigerator * ~ * . '' 
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Let us take a look at the testimony and evidence 
bearing .upon this question of agency. There is no ques-
tion but what the refrigerator in question was purchased 
from the Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company, which 
was owned by William Holdaway and Earl Fausett, and 
that subsequently Earl Fausett sold all his interest in 
the Company to William Holdaway. There was no ques-
tion but that Defendant William Holdaway was the party 
who repossessed the refrigerator on May 29. There was 
also no question but what the Carbon Furniture & Ap-
pliance Company at the time of the sale of the refriger-
ator in question to Plaintiff, and also at the time of the 
repossession of said refrigerator, was bound to Defendant 
General Electric Contracts Corporation by a dealer's 
contract. (Defendants' Ex. 1, Tr. 405.) 
There is further no question but what Plaintiff's con. 
tract with the Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company 
was duly sold and assigned to the General Electric Con-
tracts Corporation pursuant to the terms of said dealer 
contract. Among other things said dealer contract con-
tained. a promise on behalf of the Carbon Furniture & 
Appliance Company (the Defendant Holdaway as of the 
time of trial) in the following language: 
"We hereby guarantee the payments of all 
deferred payments on accounts sold to you here-
under at the time and in the manner specified in 
said accounts, and we further covenant that if 
there shall be default in any two installments of 
an account or in the performance of any require-
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ments in1posed upon the buyer therein, we shall 
pay you in cash, on de1nand, an an1ount equal to 
the unpaid balance on said account, less such 
proper portion of your purchase charge as you 
may determine.'' 
This contract further provided : 
''As and when you have received payment in 
full from us (Carbon Furniture & Appliance Com-
pany) of any account on which the Buyer has not 
made payment in full you will, on written demands 
from us, reassign to us without recourse to you, 
such account* * *." 
It is therefore apparent that during the whole period 
that the Defendant General Electric Contracts Corpora .. 
tion held the Plaintiff's contract the Defendant Holda-
way was a surety and guarantor of the Plaintiff's obliga-
tion to Defendant General Electric Contracts Corpora-
tion and that he therefore had a direct interest on his 
own account in seeing that the Plaintiff's payments to 
the Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation 
were promptly made. He was also interested in the pro-
tection of the security, that is, the refrigerator, and after 
notification from the General Electric Contracts Corpora-
toin to repurchase the Plaintiff's contract, which notice 
is Defendant's Ex. 10, Tr. 436, the obligation of collecting 
Plaintiff's account was solely the obligation of Defend-
ant Holdaway and the question of repossession for non-
payment of the purchase price was solely that of Defend-
ant Holdaway. 
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Plaintiff will contend that in the face of these in-
disputable facts the jury should have been allowed to 
speculate upon Defendant Holdaway's agency and by 
reason of such testimony as that of Sylvia Fausett, where 
she said that she talked with Holdaway after finding the 
refrigerator was gone and he said (Ab. 95, Tr. 67) that 
he was working under orders. It will be noted that even 
the wife of Plaintiff did not go so far as to say under 
whose orders. 
Plaintiff will also probably contend that the occur-
rence in the office of the General Electric Contracts Cor-
poration at Salt Lake City, after the repossession of the 
refrigerator, at which time Mrs. Fausett tendered the 
balance due on the refrigerator and Mr. Lyon, of Gen-
eral Electric Contracts Corporation said in response to 
such tender that $66.64 would clear said account as far 
as said Corporation was concerned, but he did not know 
how they stood with Defendant Holdaway, would be some 
evidence to go to the jury. 
On this point Appellant will undertake to call to the 
court's attention the pertinent sections of the Restate-
ment of Agency for the purpose of illustrating the error 
of the trial court in submitting the question of agency 
to the. jury. For the purpose of delimiting the question 
before the court let us first say that there is no ques-
tion of an express agency involved in this matter. Any 
agency which the court or jury might find would, of 
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necessity, have to be an agency arising out of "apparent 
authority.'' Furthermore, there is no question of affirm-
ance or ratification involved in this case. 
Section 220 defines a servant and sets up the fac-
tors to be considered in determining whether or not a 
person at a given time and place is the servant of another. 
"Section 220. Definition. (1) A servant is a 
person employed to perform service for another in 
his affairs and who, with respect to his physical 
conduct in the performance of the service, is sub-
ject to the ·other's control or right to control. 
(2) In determining whether one acting for 
another is a servant or an independent contractor, 
the following matters of fact, among others, are 
considered : 
(a) the extent of control which, by agreement, 
the master may exercise over the details 
of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is en-
gaged in a distinct occupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to 
whether, in the locality, the work is usual-
ly done under the direction of the employ-
er or by a specialist without supervision. 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupa-
tion; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman sup-
plies the instrumentality, tools and the 
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place of work for the person doing the 
work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is 
employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by time 
or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the 
regular business of the employer ; and 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are 
creating the relationship of master and 
servant.'' 
There is no claim on the part of anyone that De-
fendant Holdaway was acting as an independent con-
tractor in repossessing the refrigerator. It is conceded 
by all that he was acting for himself but Plaintiff con-
tends that in addition thereto he was acting for and on 
behalf of Defendant General Electric Contracts Corpora-
tion. If this is true, then Defendant General Electric Con-
tracts Corporation must have been in a position of a 
principal, as set forth in Section 14 of the Restatement 
of Agency: 
· "Section 14. A principal has the right to con-
trol the conduct of the agent with respect to mat-
ters in trusted to him.'' 
It would also be necessary to find some manifesta-
tion from the agreement to the agent that the agent may 
act on account of the principal, as set forth in Section 15. 
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'' Sect~ion 15. An agency relationship exists if 
there has been a manifestation by the principal to 
the agent that the agent may act on his account, 
and consent by the agent so to act.'' 
There is not one scintilla of evidence that Defendant 
General Electric Contracts Corporation had the right to 
control Defendant Holdaway in the repossession of the 
refrigerator, nor is there any evidence that General Elec-
tric Contracts Corporation indicated in any way that De-
fendant Holdaway could repossess the refrigerator on 
its account. 
The question of apparent authority is covered by 
Section 27 in the following language: 
'' SeGtion 27. Apparent Authority. Except for 
the execution of instruments under seal or for the 
conduct of transactions required by statute to be 
authorized in a particular way, apparent author-
ity to do an act may be created by written or 
spoken words or any other conduct of the princi-
pal which, reasonably interpreted, causes a third 
person to believe that the principal consents to 
have the act done on his behalf by the person pur-
porting to act for him. " 
There is no question but what there is no evidence 
of any conduct on behalf of Defendant General Electric 
Contracts Corporation which could be construed as au·-
thorizing Defendant Holdaway to repossess the refrig-
erator on its behalf. Section 26 outlines ~n the following 
language what constitutes the creation of authority: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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for the execution of instruments under seal or for 
the performance of transactions required by stat-
ute to be authorized in a particular way, authority 
to do an act may be created by written or spoken 
words or other conduct of the principal, which 
reasonably interpreted causes the agent to believe 
that the principal desires him to act on the prin-
cipal's account.'' 
It goes without saying that there is no contention by 
Plaintiff of the creation of any such authority by this 
Defendant. 
The restatement, In Section 33, indicates that any 
authorization or claimed authorization must be inter-
preted as of the time it is acted upon and in the light of 
the conditions under which it was made. 
"Section 33. An authorization is interpreted 
as of the time it is acted upon in light of the con-
ditions under which it was made and changes in 
conditions subsequent thereto.'' 
In this connection it is well to again recall that at 
the time the refrigerator was repossessed the Defend-
ant General Electric Contracts Corporation had called 
upon Defendant Holdaway to repurchase the Fausett 
contract because it was delinquent, all under the terms 
and conditions of the dealer contract existing between De-
fendant General Electric Contracts Corporation and De-
fendant Holdaway. The evidence conclusively shows, 
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and .without dispute, that Defendant General Electric 
Contracts Corporation, at the time of repossession, was 
looking to Defendant Holdaway for reimbursement 
against the advances made by it and not to 
Fausett or the refrigerator, and that if Defendant Hold-
away were to make himself whole out of the Fausett 
contract it was necessary for him to exercise the rights 
given to him under that contract, and that was to realize 
upon the security. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES, 
AND THE JURY FAILED TO FOLLOW THE 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT. 
On this point let us call the court's attention first 
to the law on this very important item. The rule seems 
to be well established that the measure of damages for 
the unlawful conversion by the seller of property sold 
under a conditional sales contract after the buyer has 
made payments thereon is the actual value of the prop-
erty at the time of the conversion, less the unpaid pur-
chase price. 
Roper Wholesale Grocery v. Favor (1910), 8 
Ga. App. 178, 68 S. E. 883 
Smith v. Goff (1909), 29 R.I. 439, 72 A. 289 
Goggan v. Garner (1909) (Tex.) 119 S. W. 341 
Clark v. Clement (1903), 75 Vt. 417, 56 A. 94 
There seems to be no dispute in the authorities concern .. 
ing this rule of law. 
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The court in his 15th Instruction instructed the jury 
as to the measure of damages, should they find for Plain-
tiff and find that the refrigerator could not be returned 
to the Plaintiff, in the following language: (Ab. 51, Tr. 
71) 
''You must find and determine the value of the 
refrigerator from the evidence in this case.'' 
The court further touched upon this matter in his 16th 
Instruction (A b. 51, Tr. 72) in the following language: 
'' * * * that the Defendant William Holdaway 
pay to the Plaintiff the reasonable value of said 
refrigerator at the time it was taken, with legal in-
terest thereon from May 30, 1939. '' 
It is worthy of note that the court at no place in his 
instructions instructed the jury as to the true measure 
of damages. Nowhere in the court's instructions did he 
tell the jury that they should take into consideration the 
unpaid balance still due thereon at the time of the re-
possession. On this point there is no dispute whatso-
ever that there was a balance due on the refrigerator at 
the time of its repossession in the sum of $66.64. 
As to the value of the refrigerator, the facts are 
undisputed, as shown by the purchase contract introduced 
in evidence. The refrigerator was sold for $75.00 cash 
upon the closing of the contract and 14 consecutive 
monthly installments all in the sum of $10.00, with the 
exception of the last installment, which was in the sum 
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of $11.64, or a total price of $216.64. This would indi-
cate that Plaintiff had an equity in said refrigerator of 
not to exceed $150.00. In other words, if the jury had 
found that the refrigerator was worth as much at the 
time of its repossession in May, 1939 as when sold in 
July, 1938, they could have returned a verdict for Plain-
tiff in the sum not to exceed $150.00. However, there 
was no evidence introduced which would justify a value 
as high as this. 
Plaintiff produced as a witness on his behalf on 
the question of value one Thomas Jensen, who testified 
that an electric refrigerator depreciated 10% of its value 
each year. In other words, this $216.64 refrigerator 
would depreciate $21.16 a year, which would leave a value 
at the end of the first year of $195.48, which, after de-
ducting $66.64 would amount to a value of $128.84. If 
this testimony were followed out to its ultimate conclu-
sion, a deduction for depreciation of 5/6 of 10%, or 
$17.65 would result, and this deducted from the cost 
price of $216.64 would give a figure of $198.99. Deduct-
ing the balance due, that is $66.64, from $198.99, leaves 
a balance of $132.35 as the value of Plaintiff's interest 
which was converted by the Defendants. 
Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation, 
however, elicited from its witness, Stephen Lyon, who 
had been engaged in the electric appliance business for 
13 years, that a refrigerator depreciates 40% of its value 
the first year and 30% of its remaining value each sue. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
ceeding year. According to this the depreciation on the 
refrigerator in question the first year would amount to 
$86.66, leaving a value of $129.98 and after deducting the 
unpaid balance. of $66.64 there would remain the sum of 
$63.34 as the value of Plaintiff's interest in said refrig-
erator. 
The jury, however, saw fit to disregard all of this 
testimony, as well as the instructions of the court, and 
assessed the value of the refrigerator at $184.14, which 
was the sum of $34.14 more than the amount paid in by 
Plaintiff for the refrigerator. Thus, not only was the 
instruction of the court on the question of damages com-
pletely outside the pale, but the jury completely disre-
garded the testimony. 
Plaintiff recognized this error and attempted to 
correct the same by filing on February 16, 1940, a motion 
to reduce judgment, which had been entered upon the 
verdict, in the amount of $66.64. Although Plaintiff does 
not so state, it is probably upon the assumption that if 
the jury had been properly instructed and if the jury 
had followed the testimony and instructions that they 
would have returned a verdict of $66.64 less than the 
verdict they returned. On the same date the Plaintiff 
filed a document he captained a ''Remittitur'' in which 
he said that the Plaintiff remits from the verdict of the 
jury the sum of $66.64. Thereafter on February 19, 1940 
the court made and entered an order reciting that a ver-
dict. had been returned and that a motion to reduce 
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judgment had been filed and that a remittitur had been 
filed, and the court ordered ''That the said motion to re-
duce judgment be and the same is hereby granted and 
that the remittitur of $66.64 is by the court approved." 
There is nothing in the record to show exactly what 
the judgment now is in this matter. Appellant takes the 
position that the motion to reduce judgment, the remit-
titur and the order of the court reducing judgment, all 
of which papers are found in the transcript between 
pages 141 and 145 and in the abstract on pages 60, 61 and 
62, are a complete nullity. The errors of the court in 
his instructions and the errors of the jury in failing to 
follow the instructions of the court cannot be so corrected. 
There is no such procedure provided by statute or by 
common law, and to assume that because the jury has 
returned a value for the refrigerator in excess of the 
undisputed evidence and that this may have been caused 
by failure of the court to give proper instructions on 
damages, that therefore it became the province of the 
attorney for Plaintiff and the court to fix the value of 
the refrigerator, is to say the least, new, novel and 
unique. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that there was no unlaw-
ful repossession of the Fausett refrigerator. Plaintiff 
was in default on his contract and under his contract a 
repossession such as accomplished by Defendant Hold-
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away was authorized. Defendant Holdaway, in repos-
sessing the refrigerator, was acting for and on behalf of 
himself alone in protecting his obligation as a guarantor, 
and under his agreement with General Electric Contracts 
Corporation he had been instructed to repurchase the 
Fausett obligation at the time he repossessed the refriger-
ator. 
The instruction as to damages was erroneous and 
the jury failed to follow the evidence and these errors 
can not be corrected by the court's assuming the function 
of the jury in fixing the amount of damages which he 
believes the jury would have returned had the jury been 
properly instructed and had the jury followed the testi-
mony and evidence adduced before it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT 
& MABEY, 
Attorneys for Appellant General 
Electric Contracts Corporation. 
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